F orty years ago, Weinstein and Stason published a seminal paper on the foundations for modeling cost-effectiveness in health care. 1 This paved the way for how governments and health care organizations thought about setting priorities with scarce resources. As the growth of new technologies placed greater strain on health care budgets, 2 some countries, such as the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Australia, invested in programs to use operations research methods to gain efficiencies and model the value of these new technologies.
Fast forward forty years, Capan and colleagues 3 have provided an excellent introduction to operations research in health care. It is ironic that operations research is new to many health care professionals, despite its deep and rich tradition in medicine. In a world where the average time to adopt and implement a new technology is 17 years, 4 the adoption of operations research in medicine is clearly below average. The immediate questions are why has the adoption been so slow and is there more we can do to support it?
One possible answer has been the lack of data. While the electronic medical record has plugged this void in the US, big data is not synonymous with complete data, and some types of missing data are particularly thorny for decision models. Consider a health care organization wanting to optimize care for patients with lower back pain. Every time the patient receives care for back pain, new clinical and administrative records are generated with details on each encounter, whether it is physical therapy, a new opioid prescription, or surgery. But there is no information when the patient does not receive care. Researchers have developed surrogate endpoints, such as a gap in care, to indicate that the problem has resolved. 5 Unfortunately, we do not know why the gap happened, and it could be because the pain improved or it could be because the patient changed providers. Optimizing programs with imperfect data is likely to lead to errant policies or inefficiencies. And while operations researchers can suggest that more data should be collected, health care organizations are weakly motivated to invest in new data collection systems. They are already bogged down with the huge amount of administrative and clinical data that they currently generate.
Another problem that emanates from relying on observational data is the endogeneity of the datagenerating process. Consider a health care organization wanting to develop a cost-effectiveness model for treating patients with depression. It could develop a Markov model with disease states, transition probabilities, and outcomes. The strongest evidence for transition probabilities comes from multisite, double-blinded clinical trials, but such trials are limited and few in number. Turning to the administrative or clinical data for these parameters may seem like a simple solution, but transition probabilities estimated from observational data are likely to be biased. We do not observe why a patient changed health states or why they received a treatment, and this creates a bias in the data generating process that is hard to eliminate.
Luckily, data limitations do not plague all optimization models in health care. For example, critical care doctors seeking to improve patient outcomes in intensive care units (ICUs) can create OR models along multiple domains: what is the right balance of ICU and intermediate care unit beds; how do we match ICU staffing to patient needs; or how do we integrate information from a plethora of relevant practice guidelines into a customized care plan for an individual patient? But as OR researchers scan the horizon for valuable projects, they should be especially wary of tackling questions where missing data and endogeneity are major problems.
Although a better understanding of observational data might support the growth of operations research, a lack of data or good ideas is not the ratelimiting factor. It has been over a decade since the promise of applying OR methods to health care was raised to the national level. 6 What, then, are the barriers to traversing that last mile, the one separating potential from widespread pragmatic impact?
Capan and colleagues 3 refer to operations research as multidisciplinary; but health care is traditionally disciplinary and hierarchical: hospitals have their pecking order. Such structures are not conducive to creating multidisciplinary or transdisciplinary team science, as described by Adler and Stewart. 7 To really advance the field of operations research in healthcare delivery, operations researchers need to be better integrated into the health care environment. We need to establish intensive, long-term team relationships, in which we break down the hierarchy and challenge the status quo. The likely solution requires a culture change, which, by definition, is difficult but has happened in other industries (c.f., Kaplan et al. 6 and McGrayne et al. 8 ).
Even though health care is more complicated than many originally thought, operations research coupled with a team science environment has the potential to transform care delivery. If healthcare is to realize the potential of embracing operations research, it will be because teams work together to find optimal solutions to well-formulated problems.
